Search results for "active inference"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
The Problem of Mental Action: Predictive Control Without Sensory Sheets by Metzinger, T. (2017). In Philosophy and Predictive Processing, eds T. Metz…
2018
A growing number of studies on the acquisition of lexical tone by adult learners have revealed that factors such as language background, musical experience, cognitive abilities, and neuroanatomy all play a role in determining tone learning success. On the basis of these findings, it has been argued that the effectiveness of tone learning in adulthood depends on individual differences in these factors. However, it is not clear whether similar individual differences play an analogous role in tone learning in childhood. Indeed, relatively few studies have made comparisons between how adults and children learn lexical tones. Here, we review recent developments for tone learning in both adults a…
Expanding the Active Inference Landscape: More Intrinsic Motivations in the Perception-Action Loop
2018
Active inference is an ambitious theory that treats perception, inference and action selection of autonomous agents under the heading of a single principle. It suggests biologically plausible explanations for many cognitive phenomena, including consciousness. In active inference, action selection is driven by an objective function that evaluates possible future actions with respect to current, inferred beliefs about the world. Active inference at its core is independent from extrinsic rewards, resulting in a high level of robustness across e.g.\ different environments or agent morphologies. In the literature, paradigms that share this independence have been summarised under the notion of in…
‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference
2018
One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone - even in a minimal form - arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of 'precision' that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating t…